What precisely does 'Canada +++' mean? by Blick, Andrew
What	precisely	does	‘Canada	+++’	mean?
The	Secretary	of	State	for	Exiting	the	European	Union,	David	Davis,	has	described	his	plans	for	a
future	trading	arrangement	with	the	EU	as	‘Canada	plus	plus	plus’.	But	what	precisely	does	this
expression	mean,	if	anything,	and	what	are	the	trade	and	political	implications?	Andrew	Blick	(KCL
and	the	Federal	Trust)	explains.
The	process	of	UK	departure	from	the	EU	has	begun	to	take	on	an	important	defining	characteristic.	It
involves	the	formulation	within	the	UK,	on	a	basis	of	domestic	political	imperatives,	vaguely	defined	but
ambitious	aspirations	that	do	not	survive	contact	with	external	material	realities.	UK	expectations	that	it	would	be
able	to	begin	discussing	a	future	EU-UK	Free	Trade	Agreement	(FTA)	from	the	outset	of	the	Article	50	period	were
not	met.	Instead,	sufficient	progress	from	the	point	of	view	of	the	EU27	was	required	in	three	key	areas	–	the
financial	settlement,	citizens’	rights	and	Northern	Ireland	–	before	considering	of	an	FTA	could	begin.	Not	until	8
December	this	year	were	the	two	sets	of	negotiators	able	to	issue	an	agreed	statement	on	these	terms.	The	Joint
Report	that	they	produced	illustrates	well	this	tendency	for	a	gulf	between	UK	expectations	or	objectives,	and
outcomes	ultimately	attained.	These	consequences	of	exiting	the	EU	were	not	mentioned	on	the	side	of	the	‘leave’
campaign	bus	in	June	2016;	nor	by	UK	ministers	who	chose	to	treat	the	referendum	result	as	absolutely	requiring
departure.	But	they	are	the	most	tangible	products	of	the	exit	project	to	date.
The	Article	50	process
In	the	reaching	of	this	initial	settlement,	there	have	been	concessions	on	both	sides.	The	EU	has	perhaps	been	more
flexible	than	it	might	otherwise	have	been	because	of	a	desire	to	avoid	the	collapse	of	the	Theresa	May	premiership
and	the	instability	such	a	contingency	would	create.	But	there	has	clearly	been	far	more	movement	by	the	UK,	from
its	admittedly	amorphous	initial	stance,	than	by	the	EU.	As	well	as	determining	the	overall	choreography	of	the	Article
50	process,	the	EU27	have	secured	a	substantive	agreement	within	the	broad	framework	that	they	sought.
The	UK	has	probably	not	helped	its	case	by	poor	preparation.	But	even	had	the	UK	approach	to	departure	been	of
maximum	effectiveness,	there	are	serious	constraints	upon	what	could	be	achieved.	The	EU	is	the	largest	trade	bloc
in	the	world.	It	makes	up	more	of	UK	trade	–	both	imports	(53.9	per	cent	in	2016)	and	exports	(43.1)	–	than	any	other
market,	by	some	way.	For	the	UK	to	leave	without	any	arrangement	in	place	would	be	disruptive	and	damaging	to
the	EU27,	but	far	more	so	for	the	UK.	Cabinet	members,	including	‘leave’	enthusiasts,	seem	to	have	recognised	this
point.	The	dubiousness	of	the	claim	that	‘no	deal	is	better	than	a	bad	deal’	has	been	exposed.	It	is	hard	to	conceive
of	an	agreement	worse	than	the	absence	of	one.	The	8	December	text	is	a	manifestation	of	a	need	for	both	sides	to
come	to	terms,	but	subject	to	the	substantially	greater	bargaining	position	of	the	EU.
Given	these	realisations,	when	we	consider	the	likely	course	that	FTA	negotiations	will	take,	a	good	starting	point,
rather	than	the	broad-brush	optimism	of	the	Secretary	of	State	for	Exiting	the	European	Union,	is	the	more	precisely
stated	approach	of	the	EU.	It	is	the	opening	position	of	the	EU	that	is	likely	to	be	closer	to	the	final	agreement,	if
there	is	one.
The	European	Council	guidelines	issued	on	29	April,	following	the	UK	Article	50	notification	of	a	month	beforehand,
noted	that	the	UK	government	wanted	to	leave	the	Single	Market,	and	seek	‘an	ambitious’	FTA	with	the	EU.	The
guidance	recognised	the	need	for	a	‘balanced,	ambitious	and	wide-ranging’	agreement.	However,	such	a	deal	could
not,	for	the	UK,	‘amount	to	participation	in	the	Single	Market	or	parts	thereof,	as	this	would	undermine	its	[the	Single
Market’s]	integrity	and	proper	functioning.’	The	FTA	had	to	‘ensure	a	level	playing	field’,	especially	in	such	areas	as
‘competition	and	state	aid’,	prohibiting	‘unfair	competitive	advantages’	using	such	means	as	taxes	and	regulations.
European	Council	guidelines	issued	on	15	December	underscored	these	points.	They	recorded	that	the	UK	intended
to	leave	both	the	Single	Market	and	the	Customs	Union	‘after	the	end	of	the	transition	period’.	Taking	this	trajectory
into	account,	the	European	Council	would	ensure	that	future	‘trade	and	economic	cooperation’	would	provide
expression	to	‘a	balance	of	rights	and	obligations,	preserve	a	level	playing	field,	avoid	upsetting	existing	relations
with	other	third	countries,	and…preserve	the	integrity	and	proper	functioning	of	the	Single	Market.’
Government’s	hopes	for	a	Canada-styled	agreement
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If	the	UK	wishes	to	be	able	to	diverge	from	the	internal	regulatory	regime	of	the	EU,	and	to	pursue	freedom	in
negotiating	FTAs	with	countries	and	blocs	other	than	the	EU,	there	will	be	negative	consequences	for	the	extent	of
access	to	the	Single	Market	that	is	on	offer.	The	‘have	our	cake	and	eat	it’	option	vaunted	by	‘leave’	optimists	–
whereby	the	UK	retains	those	aspects	of	EU	membership	it	wishes	to	while	jettisoning	the	others	–	is	clearly
excluded	by	the	EU	position	papers.	This	stance	on	the	part	of	the	EU27	should	not	be	surprising.	The	viability	of	the
Single	Market	is	dependent	upon	states	participating	within	it	being	prevented	from	creating	special	advantages	for
themselves	through	such	means	as	non-tariff	barriers	(including	deviating	regulations	and	restrictions	on	the	free
movement	of	people),	or	differential	customs	arrangements	with	third	parties.	As	they	have	already,	the	EU27	will
continue	to	display	some	flexibility	over	what	can	be	agreed,	but	within	limits.	Aside	from	the	need	to	protect	the
Single	Market	itself,	the	EU27	–	as	the	wording	of	their	documents	suggest	–	will	be	wary	of	offering	substantially
more	than	was	made	available	in	other	external	deals.	To	do	so	is	not	good	negotiating	or	diplomatic	practice.	One	of
the	trading	partners	the	EU	will	not	wish	to	alienate	through	gifting	excessively	favourable	terms	to	the	UK	is	Canada.
Yet	it	is	the	EU-Canada	FTA	which	the	UK	–	despite	its	frequent	references	to	bespoke	arrangements,	not	modelled
on	others	–	purportedly	hopes	to	use	as	a	baseline	and	then	build	extensively	upon.
In	fact,	the	reasons	the	Secretary	of	State	for	Exiting	the	European	Union	and	others	have	latched	upon	the	Canada
deal	seem	primarily	to	be	negative.	The	political	imperatives	that	have	driven	the	exit	project	all	along	continue	to	be
decisive	in	the	formulation	of	UK	policy,	such	as	it	is,	notwithstanding	the	serious	compromises	that	have	already
proved	necessary,	as	signified	by	the	8	December	statement.	That	the	UK	is	willing	to	make	such	a	substantial
(though	under	the	circumstances,	reasonable)	payment;	and	to	tolerate	a	significant	ongoing	role	for	the	CJEU	for	at
least	eight	years	after	exit,	along	with	the	pledges	it	has	made	regarding	the	status	of	Northern	Ireland,	represents	a
tacit	public	acknowledgement	regarding	the	nature	of	the	‘leave’	agenda,	the	significance	of	which	has	not	yet
received	the	attention	it	merits.	Though	they	will	not	present	it	in	these	terms,	the	Cabinet	and	governing	party	–	and
the	wide	range	of	opinion	included	within	them	–	have	for	the	time	being	coalesced	around	a	position	that	departure
from	the	EU	is	a	potential	source	of	great	harm	to	the	UK,	the	impact	of	which	must	be	limited	by	reducing	the	extent
of	discontinuity	(though	some	Conservatives	harbour	an	enduring	attraction	to	the	notion	of	a	clean	break).
The	EEA	option	and	its	discontents
Another	course	of	action	would	be	to	seek	participation	from	outside	the	EU	in	the	European	Economic	Area	(EEA).
The	non-EU	EEA	states	are	outside	the	Customs	Union,	and	in	this	sense,	the	EEA	model	fits	with	the	plans	of	the
UK.	But	though	the	EEA	might	appear	a	means	by	which	the	UK	could	achieve	one	of	its	present	objectives,	it	is	less
promising	in	other	respects.	Non-EU	EEA	member	states,	precisely	because	they	are	outside	the	Customs	Union,
experience	the	type	of	‘friction’	in	their	trading	relations	with	the	EU	that	the	UK	wishes	to	minimise.	Customs	barriers
remain	in	place.
It	is	true	that	non-EU	EEA	states	take	part	in	aspects	of	the	Single	Market,	perhaps	a	desirable	outcome	for	the	UK
in	as	far	as	it	now	accepts	that	the	most	abrupt	of	disengagements	from	the	EU	is	unpalatable.	Such	an	arrangement
could	also	help	the	UK	fulfil	its	commitment,	made	in	the	8	December	statement,	not	to	create	‘new	regulatory
barriers…between	Northern	Ireland	and	the	rest	of	the	United	Kingdom’,	unless	the	Northern	Ireland	devolved
institutions	agree	otherwise.	But	the	Single	Market	rewards	available	to	non-EEU	EEA	members	come	at	costs
including	financial	contributions	and	acceptance	of	the	free	movement	of	people	(if	one	regards	the	latter	as	a	cost
rather	than	neutral	in	nature,	or	a	benefit).	At	present,	open	acceptance	of	such	concessions	is	politically	difficult	for
the	UK	government.	So	too	would	be	a	recognition	that	the	UK,	like	other	non-EU	EEA	member	states,	would	need
to	accept	and	abide	by	a	substantial	volume	of	existing	and	future	EU	law	–	while	also	no	longer	having	a	direct	role
in	devising	it	(replaced	by	a	weaker	consultation	process).	Moreover,	the	CJEU,	though	it	would	not	have	the	same
jurisdiction	in	the	UK	as	it	does	now,	would	of	necessity	be	a	permanent	and	substantial	influence	on	the	operation	of
the	UK	legal	system,	enforcing	the	very	rules	that	the	UK	had	given	up	its	previous	role	in	helping	to	create.
‘Canada	plus	plus	plus’	is	a	variant	on	having	cake	and	eating	it
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Advocates	of	preserving	EEA	membership,	or	something	similar,	argue	that	a	clear	point	in	its	favour	is	that	the	EEA
is	an	existing,	functioning	entity.	It	is	this	very	quality	that	makes	it	less	useful	as	a	prospective	option	from	the	point
of	view	of	the	UK	government.	A	pre-existing	arrangement	is	by	definition	not	bespoke	and	therefore	does	not	reflect
the	special	treatment	to	which	some	feel	the	UK	is	entitled.	Furthermore,	as	the	discussion	above	shows,	to	refer	to
concrete	possibilities	is	to	invite	critical	scrutiny	of	a	UK	agenda	riven	by	contradictions.	In	such	circumstances	it	is
far	easier	to	use	terms	that	have	more	meaning	as	slogans	than	as	positive	prescriptions.	‘Canada	plus	plus	plus’	is
in	this	sense	a	variant	on	having	cake	and	eating	it.	The	term	implies	that	the	UK	will	not	be	subject	to	the	restraints
associated	with	the	EEA,	but	could	obtain	the	benefits,	and	perhaps	more	still.	Use	of	this	phrase	seeks	to	capitalise
on	claims	about	the	extensive	nature	of	the	EU-Canada	FTA	(though	the	agreement	has	controversial	aspects,
pertaining	in	particular	to	the	implications	for	public	service	provision).
Image	by	European	Council	President,	(Flickr),	licenced	under	CC	BY-NC-ND	2.0.
How	far	is	the	EU-Canada	FTA	a	viable	basis	for	an	EU-UK	FTA?
In	2016,	9.6	per	cent	of	Canadian	trade	took	place	with	the	EU;	and	2	per	cent	of	EU	trade	with	Canada.	From	the
point	of	view	of	two	parties	who	have	a	significant	amount	of	trade	with	each	other	and	are	seeking	to	facilitate	more,
the	FTA	between	them	has	clear	merit.	But	the	EU-UK	position	is	completely	different,	not	only	quantitatively,	but
qualitatively.	As	noted	above,	the	EU	is	the	source	for	53.9	per	cent	of	UK	imports,	and	the	destination	for	43.1	per
cent	of	UK	exports.	Moreover,	to	refer	to	UK	trade	with	the	EU	is	–	at	present	–	misleading.	It	trades	within	the	EU,	of
which	it	is	a	fully	incorporated	component.	The	EU-Canada	FTA	analogy	is,	in	this	sense,	unhelpful.	Like	all	the
existing	models	under	discussion	other	than	continued	EU	membership,	the	FTA	with	Canada	is	a	means	by	which
the	EU	and	another	party	can	move	forwards	from	a	starting	position	of	less	harmonisation,	towards	more.	The	EU-
Canada	FTA	was	not	designed	with	any	intention	of	its	being	adapted	to	enable	the	UK	to	shift	sideways,	retaining
some	forms	of	integration	but	relinquishing	others,	an	improbable	path	in	any	case.
Features	of	the	EU-Canada	deal	that	are	helpful	from	the	perspective	of	these	respective	parties	–	such	as	the
ending	of	customs	on	industrial	products	–	are	at	the	very	best	partially	equivalent	to	what	the	UK	already	possesses
from	inside	the	EU.	Most	of	the	FTA	falls	well	short,	to	varying	extents,	of	that	which	EU	membership	provides
automatically.	For	instance,	many	tariffs	on	agricultural	output	are	removed,	but	not	all;	and	while	the	FTA	to	some
extent	proposes	the	opening	up	of	the	market	for	services,	this	provision	is	subject	to	limitations.	Hence	the	need	for
references	to	Canada	as	a	helpful	example	to	add	in	‘plus	plus	plus’.	The	Secretary	of	State	for	Exiting	the	European
Union,	in	using	this	phrase,	remarked	further	that	parts	of	the	EU-Japan	(awaiting	approval)	and	EU-Republic	of
Korea	FTAs	could	be	appropriated,	with	firmer	provision	also	made	for	services.
No	amount	of	plusses	will	make	a	C	equivalent	to	a	B,	let	alone	an	A.
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As	anyone	who	has	marked	essays	for	a	living	knows,	adding	plusses	to	a	grade	can	be	a	way	of	pleasing	the
student	while	keeping	the	assessment	within	a	lower	band.	If	EU	membership	might	be	seen	as	an	A	and	continued
EEA	participation	from	outside	the	EU	as	a	B;	then	the	securing	of	an	FTA	is	a	C.	No	amount	of	plusses	will	make	a
C	equivalent	to	a	B,	let	alone	an	A.
‘Brexit	means	Brexit’	was	a	vacuous	slogan.	In	current	circumstance,	on	the	other	hand,	the	repetition	of	the
statements	‘exiting	the	Customs	Union	means	exiting	the	Customs	Union’	and	‘exiting	the	Single	Market	means
exiting	the	Single	Market’	could	be	helpful.	The	idea	that	the	UK	might	be	able	to	bypass	tariffs	or	deploy	non-tariff
barriers	of	its	own	devising	within	the	EU	after	it	has	left,	will	meet	immense	resistance	from	the	EU	and	its	member
states,	and	its	trading	partners,	including	those	in	the	EEA,	who	do	not	possess	similar	benefits.	As	an	EU	member,
the	UK	was	granted	a	variety	of	opt	outs	–	including	from	the	Schengen	Area,	from	other	aspects	of	Freedom
Security	and	Justice,	from	(in	a	limited	sense)	the	Charter	of	Fundamental	Rights,	and	most	importantly	of	all,	from
the	single	currency.	Whether	this	flexibility	was	to	the	benefit	of	the	EU,	or	even	the	UK	and	its	population,	is
debatable.	But	it	was	constrained	by	the	need	for	continued	observation	of	the	key	principles	of	the	EU,	including	the
four	freedoms	of	movement	for	goods,	services,	people	and	capital.	Concessions	were	made	partly	in	the	hope	of
reducing	the	risk	that	the	UK	might	one	day	leave.	In	this	sense	they	failed.	In	the	negotiations	it	is	carrying	out	now,
the	UK	no	longer	has	the	leverage	that	the	need	to	ensure	its	continued	participation	provided.	The	idea	that,	in	a
weakened	condition,	it	can	force	the	EU	to	compromise	itself	in	ways	it	would	not	beforehand,	is	difficult	to	credit.
A	full	version	of	this	post	appeared	on	The	Federal	Trust	and	it	represents	the	views	of	the	author	and	not	those	of
the	LSE	Brexit	blog,	nor	the	LSE.	
Dr	Andrew	Blick	is	Lecturer	in	Politics	and	Contemporary	History,	King’s	College	London;	and	Senior	Research
Fellow	at	the	Federal	Trust.
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